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Abstract
The paper investigates the role of broad liquidity—the supply and demand for
bank deposits—in the transmission of monetary policy. The model integrates deposit
demand, loan production, asset pricing, and arbitrage between banking and asset
markets. Broad liquidity conditions must be taken into account in the pursuit of
interest rate policy for two reasons: (1) they inﬂuence the link between the interbank
rate and market rates through their eﬀect on the external ﬁnance premium, and (2)
they aﬀect the behavior of market rates that the central bank must target in order
to maintain price stability. The paper shows how the production and use of broad
liquidity inﬂuences the “neutral” interbank rate consistent with balanced growth
and stable inﬂation. It shows how and why interbank rate policy actions must be
modiﬁed in light of broad liquidity considerations to stabilize inﬂation in response
to shocks.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Monetary policy is commonly examined in the context of models with a simpliﬁed mon-
etary transmission mechanism without any role for money itself.1 There is nothing
necessarily wrong in this. Interest rate rules for monetary policy have been shown to
deliver coherent outcomes for the price level and real variables, even in models that
ignore the demand and supply for monetary aggregates completely.2 Moreover, central
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1For example, see Brayton et al. (1997).
2See, for example, Kerr and King (1996), McCallum (2001), and Woodford (2003).banks ordinarily focus on interest rates in the transmission of monetary policy. Fur-
thermore, the demand for narrow money (currency and bank reserves) is automatically
accommodated at the current interest rate target so that interest rate policy need not
be modiﬁed to take account of narrow monetary conditions. This paper shows, however,
that interest rate policy must be modiﬁed to take account of broad monetary conditions
involving the supply and demand for bank deposits. To put it another way: a model of
monetary policy that ignores broad liquidity considerations is incomplete and misleading
as a guide to interest rate policy.3
In order to investigate the role of broad liquidity provision in the transmission of
monetary policy, the paper models the supply and demand for bank deposits in some
detail. The model integrates broad money demand, loan production, asset pricing,
and arbitrage between banking and asset markets. The aim of the paper is to build
a model rich enough but simple enough to understand the various channels by which
shocks impact conditions of supply and demand for broad money and inﬂuence the way
in which a central bank must conduct interest rate policy.
Households hold bank deposits in the model to self-insure against liquidity risk
given that consumption must be chosen before income is realized and households can
only rebalance their portfolios at the beginning of each period. Households borrow
from banks to fund beginning-of-period deposits. Loans are produced with two inputs:
management eﬀort and loan collateral. Because assets provide collateral services in
loan production, their total return is the sum of an implicit broad liquidity services
component and the usual explicit pecuniary component.
The heart of the model is the simultaneous determination of the consumption price
of physical capital q and management eﬀort m in loan production. These key variables
must satisfy two equilibrium conditions: (1) a broad liquidity condition which requires
loan production to equal deposit demand in excess of bank reserve demand, and (2) a
capital asset pricing condition that requires the implicit broad liquidity services yield
on capital plus the risk-adjusted expected pecuniary yield to equal the required total
yield on assets that is consistent with macroeconomic equilibrium. There is an external
ﬁnance premium, dependent on q and m, that links the bank loan rate to the cost
of loanable funds in general, and to the interbank interest rate in particular. A no
arbitrage condition requires the loan rate to equal the total risk-adjusted nominal return
on assets consistent with macroeconomic equilibrium. The model is employed to show
how the broad liquidity considerations outlined above must be taken into account when
monetary policy geared to maintaining price stability is implemented with an interbank
rate policy instrument.
3Ireland (2001), Leeper and Roush (2003), and Nelson (2002) suggest some theoretical reasons and
provide some empirical evidence for why money is not redundant in the transmissionn of monetary
policy given interest rates. Goodfriend (1999) contains a related discussion.
2The paper builds on the following work in macroeconomics. First, the paper adapts
the theoretical framework that Poole (1968) used to study the management of bank
reserves under uncertainty to model the demand for deposits by households. Second, the
paper builds on the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) to model the external ﬁnance
premium and the productive role of collateral in loan production. Third, the paper
builds on Keynes (1936) and Friedman (1969) to identify the implicit broad liquidity
services yield of bonds and physical capital with their productive role as collateral in
loan production.4 Fourth, the paper builds on Lucas (1978) to determine asset prices
and returns, interest rate spreads, and the division of returns between the implicit broad
liquidity services yield and the explicit pecuniary yield.5 Fifth, asset markets play a
role in the model reminiscent of Meltzer’s (1995) monetarist view of monetary policy
transmission.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Broad money demand is derived in Section
2. The loan production technology is presented, the external ﬁnance premium is intro-
duced, and equilbrium conditions for the banking sector are characterized in Section 3.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the household utility maximization problem are derived
in Section 4. Market clearing conditions and preliminary solutions for the external
ﬁnance premium are presented in Section 5. The demand for currency is derived and
price level determination is discussed in Section 6. Preliminary solutions for interest
rates, interest rate spreads, implicit broad liquidity service yields, and explicit pecuniary
yields are discussed in Section 7. The price of capital q and loan production eﬀort m
are determined in Section 8 in balanced growth with aggregate perfect foresight. The
model is then used to illustrate the consequences of the production and use of broad
liquidity for the level of the “neutral” interbank interest rate target. Section 9 shows
how and why interest rate policy actions must be modiﬁed to take account of broad
liquidity considerations for a variety of shocks to the macroeconomy. A brief summary
concludes the paper.
2 The Demand for Broad Money
Households acquire bank deposits in the model to self-insure against broad liquidity
risk. Households are exposed to liquidity shocks because consumption in a period
must be chosen before household income is realized, and consumption must be paid for
with income realized during the period, with bank deposits held at the beginning of
the period, or by overdrafting a deposit account at the end of a period. Assume that
households are conﬁdent of the central bank’s commitment to price stability so that the
4See Keynes (1936), Chapter 17 and Friedman (1969), Chapter 1.
5See Bansal and Coleman (1996) for an asset pricing model that distinguishes between explicit
pecuniary and implicit service yields to study the equity premium.
3price level P is known with certainty at the start of a period. Then, a household can
meet its liquidity needs at the end of a period if D
P +y −c>0, where D is the nominal
stock of deposits held by a household at the beginning of the period, y is real household
income earned during the period, and c is real household consumption spending during
the period. On the other hand, if D
P + y − c<0, then a household must satisfy its
end-of-period need for liquidity by overdrafting its bank account.
The net opportunity cost (in nominal terms) of being stuck with a dollar of excess
deposits at the end of a period is RT −RD, where RT is the total nominal yield foregone
by holding deposits instead of a non-monetary asset, and RD is the nominal interest rate
paid on deposits carried into the following period. The net opportunity cost per dollar
of a deﬁciency of deposits at the end of a period and having to overdraft is ROD −RT,
where ROD is the nominal interest cost of overdrafts.
Throughout the paper we assume that aggregate income and consumption are known
contemporaneously by households at the beginning of each period and that liquidity risk
facing households stems entirely from unforecastable idiosyncratic income shocks. We
use the liquidity risk facing the average household y = c(1 + ε), where ε is a zero mean
random variable, to express the random net liquidity inﬂow scaled by consumption
as
y−c
c = ε. Furthermore, we assume that a household chooses beginning-of-period
deposits D∗ to minimize the expected cost due to uncertainty about deposit gains and
losses during a period.6 Following Poole (1968) the solution D∗ to this deposit demand











ROD − RD (1)
The solution says that a household chooses its beginning-of-period real stock of deposits
D∗
P scaled by household consumption c so that the probability of overdrafting to meet
its current consumption expenses equals the expression on the right hand side of the
condition. Note the following features of the demand for deposits implied by (1). First,
condition (1) determines real deposit demand. Second, real deposit demand depends




Fourth, using the ROD >R T condition, real deposit demand varies directly with RD.
For what follows it is useful to express the real demand for deposits in terms of
desired velocity as a function of the right hand side of (1)
6The assumption of risk neutrality here simpliﬁes the characterization of the demand for deposits
with little eﬀect on subsequent analysis even though households are assumed to have log utility in
Section 4.
This model of deposit demand has much in common with Bewley’s incomplete markets model of
money demand. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), Chapter 14 and references therein for a discussion





ROD − RD] (2)
where V [ RT−RD
ROD−RD] is the desired consumption velocity of deposits and V 0[ RT−RD
ROD−RD] > 0.
In this paper we assume that real deposit demand adjusts costlessly and immediately
at the beginning of each period to consumption and desired velocity.7
3 The Banking Sector
Households borrow from banks in order to fund deposits. Loans are produced with
eﬀort to manage and monitor the extension of credit. Eﬀort is more productive in
making loans the greater the borrower’s collateral. Collateral is a valuable input in
loan production because it enables a bank to enforce the repayment of loans with less
monitoring and management eﬀort.8 The loan production technology is assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas in weighted collateral B







where L is the dollar volume of loans extended to a household, P is the price level, F
is a loan productivity coeﬃcient, B is the nominal stock of government bonds held by
ah o u s e h o l d ,K is units of productive physical capital held by a household, m is eﬀort
expended on monitoring and managing the household’s loans, q is the consumption price
of capital, k<1 is a factor weighting the productivity of physical capital relative to
government bonds as loan collateral, d is an index of economy-wide productivity that
will be identiﬁed with the dividend on capital below, and γ is a factor governing the
productivity of monitoring eﬀort in producing loans. Deposits do not provide collateral
services in loan production because their availability to pay for consumption means that
they cannot be pledged as collateral. Currency, to be introduced below, provides no
collateral services for the same reason.
A household’s external ﬁnance premium EFP depends on the amount of borrowing
it chooses to do relative to its collateral. According to loan production technology (3),
7Adjustment costs of rebalancing portfolios between broad money and other assets are important
for understanding the dynamics of velocity and broad money demand in practice. Christiano and
Eichenbaum’s (1992) work on the liquidity eﬀect highlights the important role played by portfolio
adjustment costs.
8Banks expend eﬀort and require borrowers to post collateral but in equilibrium there is no default.
This modelling choice is based, in part, on the progress that has been made in understanding the
implications of credit market imperfections in limited commitment environments such as Kocherlakota
(1996) where there is no equilibrium deﬂault.







where W is the nominal wage and the EFP is the marginal cost in hours of monitoring
and managing eﬀort multiplied by the nominal wage. Equivalently, the EFP is the
nominal marginal cost of managing and monitoring a loan for one period. Hence, the
EFP may be thought of as one component of the total per period nominal interest cost
of a nominal loan. The other component is the cost of a dollar of loanable funds RD
1−rr
which is the nominal interest rate paid on deposits RD divided by 1 − rr, where rr is
the ratio of non-interest-paying reserves to deposits held by banks. Proﬁt maximization
and competition among banks ensures that the nominal interest rate on loans equals
the nominal marginal cost of loan production: RL = EFP + RD
1−rr.
We ﬁnish characterizing equilibrium conditions in banking markets as follows. First,
an oa r b i t r a g ec o n d i t i o nm u s tb es a t i s ﬁed between the loan market and the asset market:
RL = RT, where RT is the total nominal yield on assets mentioned above. Second,
the no arbitrage condition together with the determinants of the loan rate simplify
the determination of the demand for deposits as a function of velocity in (2) as follows.
Write the interest rate on overdarafts in terms of a ﬁxed overdraft premium OP: ROD =
(OP)EFP + RD




(1−rr)(OP)EFP + rrRD. In practice, the reserve ratio is a small
fraction of deposits when the interbank interest rate is non-zero. Therefore, velocity
is approximately constant at V [ 1
OP] when RD > 0 and absolutely constant at V [ 1
OP]








where V ≡ V [ 1
OP].
The remaining banking sector equilibrium condition involves the banking system
balance sheet constraint: L =( 1−rr)D. U s e( 3 )a n d( 5 )t os u b s t i t u t ef o rL and D in








This broad liquidity provision condition is written with c on the left hand side because it
will be used to substitute for c in the household expected utility maximization problem
9An alternative speciﬁcation with similar implications to the one in the text is R




4 The Household Maximization Problem
Assume that the economy is populated with a large number of inﬁnitely-lived households









































ρ ≡ t h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c e
10Note that m eﬀort supports loans made at the beginning of a period. Eﬀort is also required for
banks to make payments and to arrange overdrafts at the end of the period. An individual household
does not know in advance whether and how much it will need to overdraft. Aggregate overdrafts,
however, can be predicted with great accuracy, as can aggregate payments. Additional eﬀort needed to
make payments and to produce overdrafts is assumed to be known at the beginning of the period and
to be taken into account in the beginning-of-period labor market clearing conditions. Eﬀort involved
in providing payments and overdraft services is assumed to be a ﬁxed proportion of m, so that m alone
can be interpreted as taking account of payment and overdraft eﬀort implicitly.
11The money-in-the-utility-function speciﬁcation of currency demand is chosen for its simplicity, so
as not to obscure the focus on broad liquidity in the model. Moreover, the model is designed to analyze
the implications for interest rate policy of factors aﬀecting broad liquidity. And the demand for
narrow money (currency and bank reserves) is automatically accommodated at the current interest rate
target so that interest rate policy need not be modiﬁed to take account of narrow monetary conditions.
Therefore, the details of the demand for currency are second order for the issues at hand.
12Broad liquidity constraint (10) plays a role here analogous to the role played by the transactions
constraint in shopping time models of narrow money demand. See Lucas (2000) and McCallum and
Goodfriend (1987).
7ct ≡ c o n s u m p t i o ni np e r i o dt
lt ≡ leisure in period t
ms
t ≡ loan production eﬀo r ts u p p l i e db yah o u s e h o l di np e r i o dt
md
t ≡loan production eﬀo r td e m a n d e db yah o u s e h o l di np e r i o dt
wt ≡the consumption wage in period t
Ct ≡currency carried from period t-1 into period t yielding utility transactions services
in period t-1 but no collateral services
Kt ≡capital goods carried from period t-1 into period t yielding a risky consumption-
good dividend in period t and collateral services in period t-1 loan production
dt ≡units of non-storable consumption goods yielded in period t per unit of Kt−1
carried from t-1 into t
Bt ≡one-period nominally denominated government bonds carried from t-1 into t yield-
ing a riskless nominal return in period t and collateral services in period t-1 loan
production
RB
t ≡the net riskless nominal return on a nominal government bond carried from t
into t+1
Pt ≡the price level in period t
qt ≡the consumption price of capital in period t
Tt ≡lump-sum taxes or transfers that balance the consolidated central bank and gov-
ernment budget in period t.13
The household’s constrained maximization problem may be solved by forming the
Lagrangian with (8), using (9) and (10) to eliminate lt and ct respectively, and choosing
sequences for ms
t,m d
t,C t,K t, and Bt and the Lagrangian multiplier λt, given initial
conditions C0,K 0,a n dB0, and the wage wt, the price level Pt, the price of capital qt,
the bond rate RB
t , the consumption dividend dt, and taxes/transfers Tt f o rt = 0 ,1 ,2 ,
3....
13The central bank and the government manage the stocks of high-powered money and government
bonds to maintain price stability as discussed below. There is no public production of goods or services
in the model.
































The ﬁrst order condition for the choice of Kt+1 is
φ
ct




where Ωt ≡ αct
Bt+1
Pt +kqtKt+1
≡ the partial derivative of the right hand side of broad liquidity
constraint (10) in period t with respect to total household weighted collateral.



















In addition to the ﬁve ﬁrst order conditions, it is useful to derive a ﬁrst order
condition for the choice of an imaginary one-period nominal bond BT
t carried from
period t-1 into t yielding a riskless nominal return in period t but no collateral services
in loan production. Such an imaginary bond is of interest because its explicit nominal
yield would be the required total net nominal yield RT
t consistent with macroeconomic










) to intertemporal budget constraint (8) and ﬁnd the ﬁrst order












95 Market Clearing Conditions and Preliminary Solutions
for the External Finance Premium
The model is closed with ﬁve market clearing conditions and an objective for monetary
and ﬁscal policy. The market clearing conditions are these:
Labor market clearing: ms
t = md
t
Goods market clearing: ct = dtK
Capital market clearing: Kd
t = K
Bond market clearing: Bd
t = Bt
High-powered money market clearing: Ct + rrDt = Ht
Labor market clearing requires that hours of loan production eﬀort supplied by the
average household ms
t equal hours of loan production eﬀort demanded md
t. Dividends
from capital are the only source of consumption goods. Goods are not storable and
the capital stock is assumed ﬁxed and normalized at K =1 , so goods market clearing
requires ct = dt. The capital dividend dt reﬂects stochastic exogenous productivity
growth. Bond market clearing requires households to hold the stock of bonds Bt supplied
by the consolidated monetary and ﬁscal authorities. High-powered money market
clearing requires that the stock of high-powered money Ht is held as either currency Ct
or bank reserves rrDt.
The central bank, with the cooperation of the ﬁscal authorities, is assumed to use
open market operations in Ht and Bt in support of interest rate policy to perfectly
stabilize the path of the price level at P0 = P with an inﬂation target of Π =
Pt+1
Pt − 1.
Under these conditions the model determines the consumption price of capital qt,
eﬀort in loan production mt, the consumption wage wt, net nominal interest rates RB
t ,
RD
t ,R L, and RT
t , consumption ct, currency Ct, deposits Dt, high-powered money Ht,
and bonds Bt. From these primary variables the model determines the consumption
return on capital rK,t h ee x t e r n a lﬁnance premium EFP, and the composition of asset
returns between the implicit broad liquidity services yield and the explicit pecuniary
yield.
In what follows the equilibrium solution for the model is approximated by using
the ﬁrst order conditions of a “representative” household that holds average per capita
wealth. While the model does not admit a representative household in the technical
sense, the approximate solution studied here should embody many if not most of the
features of the solution that takes full account of household heterogeneity.14
The remainder of this section presents some preliminary relationships that are central
to understanding the consequences of broad liquidity considerations for interest rate
policy. The ﬁrst step in solving the model is to express λt in terms of mt and dt,u s i n g
14Technically, an economy that admits a representative agent is one where model outcomes satisfy
exactly the optimality conditions of a single agent. See Krusell and Smith (1998).
10(11) and ms
t = md










Expression (17) embodies a central insight. The bracket term in (17) is positive and less
than unity if mt > 0. This means that an equilibrium with broad liquidity provision,
mt > 0, is one in which
φ
ct > λt. In such an equilibrium a household stops short of raising
consumption to the usual point where the marginal utility of consumption (MUC) is
brought into equality with the marginal utility of income (MUI). The reason is that
according to (5) optimal real deposit demand rises with consumption and acts like a
marginal tax on consumption that drives a wedge between MUC and MUI. The tax
arises because in equilibrium deposits must be ﬁnanced by bank loans that are costly
to produce. The implicit tax wedge is reﬂected in the bracket term in (17). Inspecting
the term inside the brackets, the implicit tax rate rises with mt because of diminishing
marginal product of eﬀort in loan production and diminishing marginal utility of leisure.








In expression (18), higher dt lowers MUC and therefore requires a higher real wage to
c l e a rt h el a b o rm a r k e tg i v e nmt. Higher mt requires a higher real wage to clear the labor
market given the MUC because of diminishing marginal utility of leisure.
Use (18) to substitute for the real wage w ≡ W/P in (4) to express the EFPt in












In (19) we see that the EFP rises with mt because of the higher real wage and diminish-
ing marginal product of eﬀort in loan production. Note that a higher consumption price
of capital qt lowers the EFPt because it raises the value of collateral in loan production.
Expressions (20) and (21) below are two other preliminary solutions for the EFPt.
The ﬁrst is obtained from (4) and (10) with ct = dt
EFPt =
V






























Expression (20) gives the EFPt i nt e r m so ft h er a t i oo ft h ev a l u eo fe ﬀort in loan
production relative to consumption, a useful measure of the cost of broad liquidity.
And (21) expresses that ratio and EFPt in terms of mt alone. Finally, (22) gives three
representations of the cost of broad liquidity. Note that the size of the right-most term
is directly related to the excess of the MUC over the MUI, reﬂecting the tax wedge
discussed with respect to (17) above.
6 Currency Demand and the Price Level
The purpose of this section is to derive the household’s demand for currency and to
use that demand function to derive a relationship between high-powered money and the
price level. To derive the real demand for currency combine the ﬁrst order conditions














where Ωt is deﬁned in Section 4. According to (23) currency is chosen to equate
the marginal utility of real balances to the opportunity cost. The ﬁrst opportunity
cost term reﬂects the usual interest cost foregone converted to utility terms by the λt
multiplier. The second opportunity cost term is new. It represents the marginal
implicit services yield provided by bonds as collateral in loan production and reﬂects
the fact that currency yields no collateral services in loan production.
It is useful to derive the demand for currency in terms of RT
t instead of RB
t . To do
so, use the ﬁrst order conditions for currency and the imaginary bond that yields no










There is only an interest opportunity cost term in (24) because RT
t is the total nominal
return on a bond yielding no collateral services in loan production.
12The relationship between the price level and high-powered money is derived as fol-





And use the high-powered money market clearing condition to substitute for Dt+1 in








Next, substitute for Ct+1 and λt from (24) and (17) respectively to obtain


















The price level is proportionate to the ratio of high-powered money to goods income
in the model, with the coeﬃcient of proportionality dependent as usual on deposit
velocity and the reserve ratio, as well as on a nominal interest rate. What is new is
the potential inﬂuence of loan production eﬀort mt on the price level operating through
λt, and through the eﬀect of λt on RT
t a c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁrst order condition (16) that
determines RT
t .15
We assumed in Section 5 that the central bank, with the cooperation of the ﬁscal
authorities, uses open market operations to perfectly stabilize the path for the price
level. By inverting (27) we can obtain the policy behavior for Ht+1 that does so. Note
that the eﬀect of open market operations on the stock of bonds also inﬂuences the path
for high-powered money that is consistent with price stability. The bond stock Bt+1
does not appear directly in (27), but it inﬂuences mt and RT
t indirectly through the
weighted value of collateral
Bt+1
Pt + kqtK.
7 Interest Rates, Rate of Return Spreads, and Implicit
Broad Liquidity Service Yields
For the purpose of understanding the factors determining interest rates, rate of return
spreads, and implicit liquidity service yields it is convenient to express the various
rates of return in the model in relation to the riskless total nominal interest rate RT
t .
Assuming that the central bank targets inﬂation exactly, RT
t is determined implicitly
by imposing
Pt+1
Pt =1+Π in ﬁrst order condition (16) for the household choice of the
imaginary bond yielding no collateral services
15Using currency demand function (23) instead of (24), an alternative relationship between the price











The determinants of the RT
t nominal interest rate look familiar. However, note that the
production and use of broad liquidity services in the model inﬂuences the benchmark
nominal interest rate RT
t through λt and Et[λt+1] according to (17).
To determine the government bond rate RB
t implicitly, use the ﬁrst order conditions
for the government bond and the benchmark bond, (15) and (16) respectively, together












Multiply (29) by (1 + RB
t )(1 + RT
t ) and approximate the implicit broad liquidity








Expression (30) identiﬁes the spread between the total nominal yield in asset markets
RT
t and the explicit pecuniary interest on government bonds RB
t as the implicit liquid-
ity services yield Ωt(
φ
λtdt − 1).T h i s v e r i ﬁes that the opportunity cost term discussed
in connection with the demand for currency (23) is approximately the implicit broad




qt −1 ≡ the net explicit real pecuniary return on capital carried
from period t to t+1. To determine the net expected explicit real return on capital
EtrK
t use the ﬁrst order conditions for capital and the benchmark bond, (14) and (16)
respectively, together with ct = dt,a n d
Pt+1
















t ]} − 1 (31)
Multiply (31) by (1 + Π) a n da p p r o x i m a t et h el i q u i d i t ys e r v i c e sy i e l do nc a p i t a la s
LSY K
t =( RT









Comparing (30) and (32) we see that LSY K
t = kLSY B
t . The liquidity services yield
on capital is a fraction k of that on bonds because k reﬂects the lower productivity in
16This result is related to Huggett’s (1993) ﬁnding that the equilibrium risk-free interest rate is below
the rate of time preference when agents experience uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment shocks and
smooth consumption by holding the risk-free asset. Using the terminology developed here, we would
say that the positive spread between the rate of time preference and the risk-free rate in Huggett’s
model represents the implicit broad liquidity services yield on the risk-free asset.
14(3) of capital relative to bonds as collateral in loan production. Furthermore, from
(20) and (22) we see the close relationship between the liquidity service yields and the
external ﬁnance premium: LSY K
t = kLSY B
t = kΩt[1−rr
V ]EFPt. In particular, note
that the liquidity service yields are positive if and only if there is an external ﬁnance
premium.
Rewrite (32) as EtrK
t =( RT




t ] to see that the equili-
bium expected explicit real pecuniary return to capital EtrK
t depends on three factors:
(1) the inﬂation-adjusted riskless nominal interest rate RT
t − Π on a bond yielding no
liquidity services in loan production, (2) the implicit broad liquidity services yield on
capital kΩt(
φ
λtdt − 1), and (3) and a risk compensation term Covt[
λt+1
λt ,rK
t ]. Note that
EtrK
t c a nb ee i t h e rh i g h e ro rl o w e rt h a nRT




t − Π given Covt[
λt+1
λt ,rK
t ].17 However, the risk term Covt[
λt+1
λt ,rK
t ] pushes the
expected explicit real pecuniary yield on capital up, since returns surprises are nega-
tively correlated with MUI surprises and households must be compensated with a higher
expected explicit return for bearing risk.18
Finally, there are two nominal interest rates in the model that need to be deter-
mined, the nominal deposit rate RD
t and the nominal interbank interest rate RIB
t . The
deposit rate is determined by the equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue in
loan production RL
t = EFPt +
RD
t
1−rr together with the no arbitrage condition RL
t = RT
t
between the loan market and the asset market
RD
t =( 1− rr)(RT
t − EFPt) (33)
The interbank interest rate is determined by the equalization of the cost of alterna-
tive sources of loanable funds and by the fact that banks do not hold reserves against







t − EFPt (34)
where the EFPt is determined according to (19), (20), or (21). The interbank rate
plays a key role as the interest rate policy instrument in Sections 8 and 9 below.
17This result is related to Ayagari’s (1994) ﬁnding that agents are willing to accumulate capital in
the steady state past the point that its net marginial product equals the rate of time preference, when
capital provides self-insurance against idiosycratic income risk. Using the terminology developed here,
w ew o u l ds a yt h a tt h ep o s i t i v es p r e a db e t w e e nt h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dt h em a r g i n a lp r o d u c to f
capital in Ayagari’s model represents the implicit broad liquidity services yield on capital.
18The speciﬁcation of log utility assumed here governs the required compensation for risk.
158 The “Neutral” Interbank Rate in Balanced Growth with
Aggregate Perfect Foresight
The full equilibrium of the model economy is presented and characterized in this section
for the case of balanced growth with aggregate perfect foresight. The model is used
to show how the “neutral” interbank interest rate depends on factors related to the
production and use of broad liqudity.
8.1 The Balanced Growth Equilibrium







Pt /dtK = b B, where g ≡ productivity growth,
Π ≡ the inﬂation rate, and b B ≡ a constant ratio of real government bonds to output.
Deﬁne the constant Q such that: qt = dt
ρ Q. In what follows we seek the constant values
of loan production eﬀort m and the stationary transform of the consumption price of
capital Q that satisfy the equilibrium conditions of the model.
















Starting with the ﬁrst order condition for capital (14), use the above conditions
implied by balanced growth, equation (22), the deﬁnition of Q, the deﬁnition of Ωt, and
ct = dt to derive an equilibrium condition that reﬂe c t sc a p i t a l ,g o o d s ,a n dl a b o rm a r k e t
clearing. The “CL” condtion is
1 −
αk














CL condition (35) is the ﬁrst of two equilibrium conditions that determine m and Q
(and qt indirectly) on a balanced growth path. The capital price transform Q aﬀects the
CL condition through two channels: (1) higher Q lowers the right hand side of (35) by
lowering the explicit pecuniary return and (2) higher Q raises the left hand side of (35)
by lowering the implicit broad liquidity services yield on capital because of diminishing
marginal productivity of collateral in loan production. Loan production eﬀort m aﬀects
the CL condition through its eﬀect on the liquidity services yield: higher m lowers the
left hand side of (35) by raising the marginal product of collateral in loan production,
thereby raising the implicit broad liquidity services yield on capital as collateral.
Note the following features of (35). First, if m =0 , then (35) reduces to Q =1 ,
which implies that qt = dt
ρ and rK = RT − Π =( 1 + g)(1 + ρ) − 1. Second, if
m>0, then Q>1, qt > dt
ρ ,a n drK =( 1+g)(1 +
ρ
Q) − 1.T h i r d , i f m>0, then
LSY K =( RT − Π) − rK = ρ(1 + g)(1 − 1
Q).
16The second equilibrium condition is derived by imposing ct = dt and
Bt+1
Pt /dtK = b B








BL condition (36) is a loan market clearing condition that reﬂects the banking system
balance sheet constraint and embodies factors governing the demand for deposits and
the production of loans. The capital price transform Q and loan production eﬀort m
aﬀect the BL condition through their positive eﬀect on loan production.
CL condition (35) and BL condition (36) simultaneously determine constant values of
Q and m along the balanced growth path. The equilibrium is most easily characterized
by imagining the two equilibrium conditions drawn in a space with Q on the vertical
axis and m on the horizontal axis. The CL locus slopes upward and is convex from





. The BL locus slopes downward and is also convex from below; it
intersects the horizontal axis at m =( [ 1−rr
VF(K b B)α]
1
1−α)/γ and asymptotes to the vertical
axis. Hence, an equilibrium exists where the two loci intersect at Q>1 and 0 <m<1.
From qt = dt
ρ Q we see that the consumption price of capital qt grows at the productivity
growth rate g on a path that is permanently higher than if collateral services were not
valued.19 Moreover, we see that implicit broad liquidity service yields are positive:
LSY K = kLSY B = ρ(1 + g)(1 − 1
Q) > 0 From (19) or (21) we see that the external
ﬁnance premium EFP is positive as well.
8.2 The “Neutral” Interbank Interest Rate
The Federal Reserve and other central banks typically implement monetary policy with
a nominal interbank interest rate policy instrument. To help guide interest rate policy
in practice, it is useful to have an idea of the “neutral” level of the nominal interbank rate
that is consistent with a balanced economic expansion and the price level stabilized on
a path consistent with the central bank’s inﬂation target. We interpret the level of the
interbank rate RIB in balanced growth as the “neutral” interbank rate and investigate
its determinants below.
From (34) we know that RIB = RT −EFP. Imposing the relevant balanced growth
and inﬂation targeting conditions in (16), we appoximate RT = ρ+g+Π.T h u s ,w es e e
that the total nominal interest rate RT in balanced growth is determined exclusively by
19In the standard one-sector growth model with investment, the consumption price of capital would
be unity on a balanced growth path and the capital stock would be permanently above what it would
be if broad liquidity (and collateral services) were not valued.
17the standard factors: productivity growth, time preference, and the inﬂation rate. The
neutral interbank rate inherits these standard determinants.
However, the neutral interbank rate depends in balanced growth on factors aﬀecting
the production and use of broad liquidity through the external ﬁnance premium. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to explore the magnitude of broad liquidity eﬀects on
the neutral interbank rate. Instead, we describe below the nature of the inﬂuence of
broad liquidity considerations by showing how the following structural shifts inﬂuence
the external ﬁnance premium:
(1) A reduction in F or γ that reﬂects lower productivity of collateral and eﬀort in
loan production shifts the BL locus up in Q,m space and raises equilibrium Q and m.
The EFP rises, too, according to (21) and pushes RIB down since RT is unaﬀected.
(2) A reduction in velocity V or a decrease in reserve ratio rr shifts the BL locus up
and raises Q and m. A c c o r d i n gt o( 2 1 )t h ee ﬀect on EFP is ambiguous in this case,
as is the eﬀect on the neutral interbank rate.
(3) An increase in uninsurable idiosyncratic liquidity risk, perhaps associated with
ah i g h e rg r o w t hr a t eg and more intense job creation and destruction, aﬀects both the
production and use of broad liquidity. On the production side, F and γ fall as more
collateral and eﬀort are required to manage and monitor loans. And on the use side,
velocity falls as households increase their deposits. In addition, the total required
nominal interest rate rises with productivity growth. Multiple impacts on the demand
and supply of broad liquidity such as these have the potential to exert particularly large
eﬀects on the external ﬁnance premium and the neutral interbank rate.
(4) An increase in the outstanding stock of government bonds b B relative to output
raises the weighted value of collateral in the economy and thereby shifts the BL and the
CL locus down. Since BL shifts down by more than CL, both Q and m fall, as does
the EFP according to (21). Since RT is unaﬀected, the neutral interbank rate RIB
rises. Other things the same, the neutral interbank rate would tend to be positively
correlated with the stock of government bonds outstanding.
[Note: In this model with non-distorting lump sum taxes, the increased stock of
bonds has two countervailing eﬀects on welfare: (1) it increases household utility by
reducing equilibrium eﬀort m in loan production, and (2) it reduces household utility
according to (17) and (24) by raising λt on the balanced growth path and reducing real
currency balances held by households. This negative eﬀect actually undoes a beneﬁto f
m>0 that pushes λt below
φ
dt, and helps to oﬀset the underutilization of currency due
to a positive nominal interest rate.20]
(5) An increase in trend productivity growth g or in the inﬂation target Π raises RT
but has no eﬀect on Q, m, EFP,o rt h eLSY s.
20See Ayagari and McGrattan (1998) for a study of the optimum quantity of government debt in an
incomplete markets model in which bonds provide self-insurance.
18(6) An increase in the level of the path of productivity, dt, holding g constant, raises
the consumption price of capital according to qt =
Q
ρ dt but has no eﬀect on Q, m, EFP,
or the LSY s.
(7) Finally, the non-linear nature of the BL and CL loci in Q,m space means that the
sensitivity of Q, m, EFP,a n dt h eLSY s to structural shifts such as those described
above could vary signiﬁcantly depending on the relative positions of the loci which,
among other things, depend on the stock of government bonds outstanding.
Bottome line: A model of monetary policy that ignores broad liquidity considerations
is incomplete and potentially highly misleading as a guide to factors aﬀecting the neutral
interbank interest rate in balanced growth with inﬂation stabilized at the central bank’s
target.
9 Interest Rate Policy Actions and Broad Liquidity
Broad liquidity considerations matter not only for the neutral interbank rate but also
for interbank interest rate policy actions that must be taken to stabilize inﬂation at the
central bank’s target in response to shocks that hit the economy. This section shows
how and why interest rate policy actions must be modiﬁed to take account of broad
liquidity. We study a variety of shocks to the macroeconomy below using short-run
equilibrium conditions that correspond to the CL and BL conditions derived and utilized
to study balanced growth in Section 8.
The central bank is presumed to follow a fully credible interest rate rule that perfectly
stabilizes the path of the price level. It is assumed to understand the structure of the
economy, including the production and use of broad liquidity, and to observe the shocks
contemporaneously. The interest rate rule requires the central bank to set its interbank
rate policy instrument RIB
t each period, conditional on observing the shock(s), so that
the loan rate RL
t tracks exactly the total nominal interest rate RT
t necessary to keep
inﬂation on target. The analysis proceeds in four steps.
First, determine the consequences of the shock(s) for qt and mt using two short-run
equilibrium condtions. The short-run “SRCL” condition is derived from the ﬁrst order
condition for capital (14), broad liquidity constraint (10), the determinants of λt (17),


















The short-run “SRBL” condition is derived from broad liquidity constraint (10) with









19The SRCL and SRBL conditions, (37) and (38), simultaneously determine qt and mt
taking dt and Et[λt+1(qt+1+dt+1)] as exogenous. The
Bt+1
Pt term is largely predetermined
since the price level is presumed to be stabilized along a predetermined path and the
nominal stock of government bonds mostly results from past government borrowing.
In what follows we ignore the change in Bt+1 associated with open market operations
in Ht+1 required to oﬀset the eﬀect of period t shocks on the price level according to
(27). The channels of inﬂuence of qt and mt are identical to those discussed with
respect to the CL and BL conditions in balanced growth. The short-run conditions
have the same shapes diagrammatically as their balanced-growth counterparts, except
that we can think of the two loci in q,m instead of in Q,m space. SRCL intersects the
vertical axis at qt = dt









Second, determine the consequences for λt from (17), and for RT
t from (28).
Third, determine the consequences for EFPt from (19), (20), or (21).
Fourth, determine the consequences for RIB
t from (34) using the results for RT
t and
EFPt.
We analyze three types of shocks to the macroeconomy below: (1) an expectations
shock, (2) a temporary productivity shock, and (3) temporary direct shocks to the broad
liquidity sector. We use the model to derive the policy action that a central bank must
take with its interbank rate instrument RIB
t in response to each type of shock to keep
the price level on its targeted path.
9.1 An Expectations Shock
Consider a negative shock to the expected price of capital Etqt+1, assuming no change
in Etλt+1, Etdt+1, or in the conditional covariances. The pessimism about the future is
transmitted to the present through the expectations term in the SRCL condition, which
shifts the SRCL locus down in qt, mt space. Since the SRBL locus does not shift, the
shock causes qt to fall and mt to rise. According to (17), higher mt reduces λt. From
(28) we see that lower λt reduces RT
t as well. And from (19) we see that lower qt and
higher mt raise the EFPt. Finally, from (34) we see that the central bank must lower
its interbank rate policy instrument RIB
t to maintain its inﬂation target because RT
t
falls and the EFPt rises.
We can interpret the above eﬀects as follows. The negative shock to the expected
price of capital reduces the expected explicit pecuniary return, and the current price
of capital falls to restore the total risk-adjusted return to capital. However, the lower
current price of capital reduces aggregate collateral in the economy. Reduced collateral
lowers the productivity of eﬀo r ti nl o a np r o d u c t i o na n dr e q u i r e sa ni n c r e a s ei ne ﬀort to
clear the loan market. The lower price of capital and greater eﬀo r ti nl o a np r o d u c t i o n
20raise the liquidity services yield on capital, and help to bring the total return to capital
back up the required total return. In this case broad liquidity considerations actually
attenuate the fall in the current price of capital.
The total nominal interest rate RT
t falls because increased eﬀort in loan production
raises the current relative to the future implicit marginal tax on consumption discussed
in connection with (17) so that the total real interest rate RT
t − Π must fall to clear
the goods market. This second factor also attenuates the fall in the current price of
capital.
The EFPt rises for the same reason as the rise in the LSYt, the reduction in collateral
and the increase in eﬀort raise the marginal cost of loan production.
This example was choosen because large asset price movements occur relatively
frequently in the short run, and because the example nicely highlights the implications
of the production and use of broad liquidity for policy actions. In this case literally
no change in the interbank rate is needed to keep inﬂation on target in the absence
of eﬀects due to the production and use of broad liquidity. Yet the analysis identiﬁes
eﬀects on both RT
t and EFPt due to broad liquidity considerations as reasons why the
interbank rate ought to be lowered in response to a fall in asset prices.
We see from (24) that the demand for currency rises because λt and RT
t both fall,
and from (27) we see the corresponding increase in the demand for high-powered money
Ht+1. The central bank automatically accommodates any change in the demand for
narrow money in defense of its interbank rate target, whether or not it adjusts its
interbank rate target in response to the shock. Thus, the consequences for interest rate
policy of narrow and broad money considerations diﬀer sharply: Interest rate policy
actions need not be modiﬁed to take account of factors aﬀecting narrow money demand,
but they must be modiﬁed to take into account factors aﬀecting the production and use
of broad money in order to stabilize inﬂation in response to the asset price shock.
9.2 A Temporary Productivity Shock
Consider a negative shock to current productivity dt expected to be transitory. Lower
productivity shifts both the SRCL and the SRBL locus down in qt,m t space. The
SRBL locus shifts down because the lower dt consumption scale variable in the demand
for deposits reduces loan demand by more than the reduced dt productivity index in
loan production reduces loan supply. Hence, qt must fall given mt to bring loan supply
down to loan demand in order to restore SRBL condition (38).
SRCL shifts down for two reasons. First, from the discussion following (32) we
know that LSY K
t = kΩt[1−rr
V ]EFPt. And from (21) we know that EFPt is unchanged
given mt.B u ts i n c eΩt falls with dt,L S YK
t .falls also. Second, reduced dt raises MUCt
and λt given mt by (17), and raises RT
t according to (28). Hence, qt must fall given
mt to move the LSY K
t back up and to raise the expected explicit pecuniary return to
21capital EtrK
t in order to restore SRCL condition (37).
SRCL shifts down by less then SRBL so that both mt and qt fall.21 From (17)
we know that λt rises unambiguously both because lower mt temporarily reduces the
implicit marginal tax rate on consumption and because lower consumption temporarily
raises MUCt . Hence, RT
t must rise to clear the goods market as indicated in (28). And
w es e ef r o m( 2 1 )t h a tt h eEFPt falls unambguously.
According to (34), since RT
t rises and EFPt falls the central bank must increase
its interbank rate target RIB
t in order to hit its inﬂation target. For this temporary
negative productivity shock, even without broad liquidity considerations RIB
t would
have to rise with RT
t for the standard reason—because MUCt is elevated relative to
EtMUCt+1. Taking broad liquidity considerations into account ampliﬁes the required
increase in RIB
t by reducing the EFPt, and by lowering mt,i n c r e a s i n gλt relative to
Etλt+1, and raising RT
t even further.
9.3 Temporary Direct Shocks to the Broad Liquidity Sector
Consider shocks that directly create an excess demand for loans: a decrease in deposit
velocity V, a decrease in the bank reserve ratio rr, or a decrease in productivity coeﬃ-
cients F and γ that govern loan supply. These shocks shift the SRBL locus up in qt,m t
space but do not shift the SRCL locus. The shocks raise both qt and mt because some
combination of an increase in collateral values and an increase in loan production eﬀort
is needed to restore equilibrium in the loan market. Higher mt lowers λt according to
(17) because it raises the implicit tax on consumption. And temporarily lower λt also
requires a lower RT
t to clear the goods market according to (28).
The analysis of the four shocks diﬀers from this point on. A decrease in F or
γ unambiguously raises the EFPt according to (21), so that the central bank must
unambiguously reduce RIB
t in response to a reduction of productivity in loan supply.
However, from (19) or (21) we see that the eﬀects on the EFPt are ambiguous for the V
and rr shocks, as is the direction of the interbank rate policy response necessary to keep
inﬂation on target. Nevertheless, the lesson is that interest rate policy cannot ignore
shocks originating in the broad liquidity sector. There is no automatic accommodation.
In general, interbank rate policy actions must be undertaken in response to such shocks
to sustain the targeted rate of inﬂation.






in qt is the downward shift in SRBL at an unchanged mt. Now consider the same decrease in qt at
an unchanged mt in SRCL. The left hand side of SRCL would be unchanged, but the right hand side
would rise. Hence, SRCL shifts down by less than SRBL.
2210 Conclusion
Central banks favor interest rate policy in large part because the demand for currency
and bank reserves is automatically satisﬁed by open market operations taken in defense
of an interbank rate target. This feature of interest rate targeting is especially attrac-
tive when the demand for narrow liquidity rises suddenly and substantially in times of
ﬁnancial stress. Unfortunately, automatic accommodation does not extend to broad
liquidity–bank deposits backed by loans. Interest rate policy must by modiﬁed to
oﬀset the eﬀect on the economy of conditions in the market for broad liquidity. We saw
that broad liquidity conditions must be taken into account in the pursuit of interest rate
policy for two reasons: (1) they inﬂuence the link between the interbank rate and mar-
ket rates through their eﬀect on the external ﬁnance premium, and (2) they aﬀect the
behavior of market interest rates that the central bank must target in order to maintain
macroeconomic stability. We showed how the production and use of broad liquidity
inﬂuences the neutral level of the interbank rate consistent with balanced growth and
stable inﬂation, and we showed that interbank rate policy actions must be modiﬁed in
light of broad liquidity considerations to stabilize inﬂa t i o ni nr e s p o n s et os h o c k s .
23References
[1] Ayagari, S. Rao. 1994. “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, no. 3 (August): 659-84.
[2] , and Ellen R. McGrattan. 1998. “The Optimum Quanity of Debt.”
Journal of Monetary Economics 42, no. 3 (December): 447-69.
[3] Bansal, Ravi and Wilbur John Coleman II. 1996. “A Monetary Explanation of
the Equity Premium, Term Premium, and Risk-Free Rate Puzzles.” Journal of
Political Economy 104 (December): 1135-71.
[4] Bernanke, Ben S., and Mark Gertler. 1995. “Inside the Black Box: The Credit
Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission.” Journal of Economic Perspectives
9, no. 4 (Fall): 27-48.
[5] Brayton, Flint, Andrew Levin, Ralph Tryon, and John C. Williams. 1997. ”The
Evolution of Macro Models at the Federal Reserve Board.” Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy 47 (December): 43-81.
[6] Christiano, Lawrence J. and Martin Eichenbaum. 1992. “Liquidity Eﬀects and the
Monetary Transmission Mechanism.” American Economic Review 82 (May):
346-53.
[7] Friedman, Milton. 1969. The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays.
Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing Company.
[8] Goodfriend, Marvin. 1999. “Discussion 2. In Money, Monetary Policy, and Trans-
mission Mechanisms. Bank of Canada, Ottawa: 413-21.
[9] Huggett, Mark. 1993. “The Risk-Free Rate in Heterogeneous-Agent Incomplete-
Insurance Economics.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 17: 953-69.
[10] Ireland, Peter. 2001. “Money’s Role in the Monetary Business Cycle.” NBER Work-
ing Paper no. W8115.
[11] Kerr, William and Robert King. 1996. “Limits on Interest Rate Rules in the IS
Model.” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 82, no. 2
(Spring): 45-75.
[12] Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money. London: McMillan and Company, 1957. (ﬁrst edition 1936)
[13] Kocherlakota, Narayana. 1996. “Implications of Eﬃcient Risk-Sharing Without
Commitment,” Review of Economic Studies 63: 595-610.
[14] Krusell, Per, and Anthony A. Smith, Jr. 1998. “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity
in the Macroeconomy.” Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 5 (October):
867-96.
24[15] Leeper, Eric M. and Jennifer E. Roush. 2003. “Putting “M” Back in Monetary
Policy.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35, no. 6, part 2 (December):
1217-56.
[16] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1978. “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy.” Econometrica
46, no. 6: 1426-45.
[17] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 2000. “Inﬂation and Welfare.” Econometrica 68, no. 2
(March): 247-74.
[18] Ljungqvist, Lars, and Thomas J. Sargent. 2000. Recursive Macroeconomic Theory.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
[19] McCallum, Bennett. 2001. “Monetary Policy Analysis in Models without Money.”
NBER Working Paper no. 8174.
[20] McCallum, Bennett, and Marvin Goodfriend. 1987. “Demand for Money: Theo-
retical Studies.” In The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics,e d i t e db y
John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman. New York: The Stockton
Press: 775-80.
[21] Meltzer, Allan H. 1995. “Monetary, Credit and (Other) Transmission Processes:
A Monetarist Perspective.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no 4 (Au-
tumn): 49-72.
[22] Nelson, Edward. 2002. “Direct Eﬀects of Base Money on Aggregate Demand: The-
ory and Evidence.” Journal of Monetary Economics 49 ( ): 687-708.
[23] Poole, William. 1968. “Commercial Bank Reserve Management in a Stochastic
Model: Implications for Monetary Policy” Journal of Finance 23 (December):
769-91.
[24] Woodford, Michael. 2003. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Mon-
etary Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
25